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This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the political and institu- 
tional  determinants of  fiscal outcomes by  studying  the behavior of  public 
spending in the Argentine provinces since the return to democracy in  1983. 
Argentina is a federal republic with 23 provinces, and provincial finances play 
an important role in the overall fiscal picture of the country, with approximately 
50 percent of total government expenditures occumng at the subnational level. 
The Argentine provinces possess a considerable amount of diversity in terms of 
their party systems, executive-legislative relations, and fiscal behavior, making 
Argentina an ideal laboratory for this type of study. 
We begin in section 6.1 with a description of a vitally important aspect of 
Argentina’s fiscal structure: its degree of vertical imbalance, by which a very 
large proportion of provincial spending is financed out of  a common pool of 
tax revenues. Section 6.2 summarizes our theoretical approach, which empha- 
sizes the common-property  view of  fiscal politics. Section 6.3 presents  the 
main hypotheses, and section 6.4 contains the empirical analysis of the politi- 
cal determinants of provincial spending. Section 6.5 briefly studies the effect 
of budget institutions on provincial fiscal outcomes, while section 6.6 provides 
some concluding remarks. 
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Sanguinetti is professor of economics at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
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6.1  Argentina’s Federal Fiscal Structure 
The Argentine constitution establishes that the federal government will em- 
ploy tariffs on foreign trade to finance its expenditures, while provinces will 
finance themselves through taxes on production and the consumption of spe- 
cific goods. Over time however, for both economic and political reasons, the 
national government became the main agent responsible for the collection of 
all taxes at the provincial level. The process by which these taxes, once col- 
lected, are then reallocated to the provinces has been the source of numerous 
conflicts and modifications.’ Argentina’s first national tax-sharing agreement 
(the Ley de Coparticipaci6n Federal) dates from 1934.2  Periodically, new laws 
have been  written to regulate this distribution. The current law dates from 
1988. Under this law the federal government retains 42 percent of these taxes, 
while 57 percent is distributed among the provinces, with the remaining 1 per- 
cent set aside to finance unforeseen crises in the provinces. The law also estab- 
lishes the percentages of the secondary distribution and is supplemented by 
several other laws regulating the distribution and destination of a few specific 
taxes that finance a set of predetermined activities. 
Argentina is the most decentralized country in Latin America in terms of 
public spending, with approximately 50 percent of total public spending oc- 
curring at the subnational level (Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti, chap. 5 in this vol- 
ume). At the same time, Argentina has a high degree of vertical fiscal imbal- 
ance. During the period under analysis (1985-95,  excluding 1989), an average 
of 80 percent of provincial expenditures were financed from the Ley de Copar- 
ticipaci6n Federal (along with other transfer mechanisms), while an average of 
only 20 percent were financed from provincial revenues. The data in table 6.1 
demonstrate that all of the country’s 23 provinces on average financed less than 
half of their expenditures with provincial revenues, and nearly three-fourths 
financed less than one-fourth. Most of the transfers from the federal govern- 
ment are done on behalf of a delegation of tax authority from the provinces, in 
such a way that the use of 71 percent of the transfers is left to the discretion of 
the provincial governments (the remaining 29 percent of the transfers is ear- 
marked for specific activities). 
6.2  The Effect of Political and Institutional Variables on Public-Sector 
Spending: The Common Property Approach 
We view the provincial fiscal accounts as the outcome of a multiagent game. 
The key players in our game are politicians interested in providing net benefits 
1. For an analysis of Argentine fiscal federalism see Port0 1990. 
2. These tax-sharing agreement laws define the share of taxes to be transferred from the central 
government to the provinces (ic,  the primary distribution) and the way in which these funds are 
to be allocated among the provinces (i.e., the secondary distribution). 137  Politics, Institutions, and Public-Sector Spending 
Table 6.1  Percentage of Provincial Expenditure Financed with Provincial 
Revenues, 1985-95 
Province  Percentage 
Buenos Aim  49 
Santa FB  40 
C6rdoba  36 
Mendoza  31 
La Pampa  30 
Entre Rios  21 
Salta  20 
Tucumin  20 
Neuqutn  20 
Rio Negro 



























23-province average  20 
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda, Ministerio de Ekonomia, Obras, y Servicios Xblicos, Rep6blica 
Argentina. 
Note: Data from 1989 are excluded. For more information, see note 15 in the text. 
to their constituencies. A substantial portion of  these local or particularistic 
benefits are financed out of a common pool of taxes (current or future). 
This common-property approach to fiscal politics was pioneered by Wein- 
gast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), and extended by others such as Inman and 
Fitts (1990), Chari and Cole (1995), Campos and Pradhan (1996), and Velasco 
(1998). As is the case with any common resource, there is an overutilization of 
national wealth. Political economists know  this  process as  “universalism,” 
while the popular term in the United States is “pork-barrel  politic^."^ In some 
versions, this generates suboptimal aggregate outcomes from the point of view 
of  the political actors (e.g., legislators). In others, the outcome is suboptimal 
3. The term “universalism” comes from Weingast (1979). The discussion in the text draws from 
Inman and Fitts (1990). 138  Mark P.  Jones, Pablo Sanguinetti, and Mariano Tommasi 
from the point of view of citizens due to fiscal illusion (Weingast, Shepsle, and 
Johnsen  1981), or to principal-agent  problems in  the relation  between  the 
people and their representatives (Tommasi 1998).4 
We emphasize the common-pool problem at two levels, corresponding to 
the federal fiscal organization of Argentina described in the previous section. 
On the one hand, every province sees the aggregate national (present and fu- 
ture) taxing capacity as a common resource. On the other, each provincial leg- 
islator sees the provincial (and national) taxing capacity as a common resource. 
Political factors  (such as the relations between  the president  and provincial 
governors  and  divided  versus  unified  government)  and  budget  institutions 
(such as costly borrowing procedures) act to exacerbate or mitigate the under- 
lying problem. 
In this chapter we focus on the impact of political factors on provincial pub- 
lic  pend ding.^  We  emphasize spending and not provincial revenues because 
there are two countervailing forces in terms of the impact of politics on provin- 
cial fiscal revenues. 
First, there is the standard “size” effect emphasized by Weingast, Shepsle, 
and Johnsen (198 l), under the assumption of a balanced budget. This leads to 
the prediction that certain institutional configurations lead to higher spending 
and higher taxes than do  other configurations. Second, as we emphasize below, 
in the Argentine case there are negative externalities across provinces that lead 
provincial governments to overspend and undertax (in the spirit of what Inman 
and Fitts [  19901 call “tax  expenditures”).  Combining these two effects, we 
obtain clear-cut predictions from institutional and political variables to expen- 
diture outcomes, while the implications for provincial revenues will depend on 
which effect dominates. 
Within the common-pool view, individuals and institutions  elected by re- 
gional representation (e.g., governors within the context of the nation, and leg- 
islators within the context of  the province) have a greater tendency to act as 
free-riders on the collective good of fiscal prudence than individuals and insti- 
tutions  chosen from more encompassing constituencies  (e.g.,  the  president 
within the context of the nation and the governor within the context of  the 
province). As stated before,  we emphasize this hypothesis  at two levels:  in 
terms of the behavior of each province vis-8-vis the consolidated national fiscal 
accounts, and in terms of  the provincial legislatures  vis-i-vis the provincial 
executive branches. 
4. Tommasi (1998) argues that agency slack is necessary for the suboptimality of  fiscal out- 
comes. Otherwise, elected representatives should be able to reach an agreement on optimal fiscal 
policy. This pushes the collective action problem to the level of the citizens, via their control of 
elected officials. 
5. In Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 1997a we focus on fiscal deficits. 139  Politics, Institutions, and Public-Sector Spending 
6.3  Determinants of Provincial Public-Sector Spending: 
Three Hypotheses 
Taking into consideration fiscal arrangements in Argentina, as well as the 
common-property approach just described, we develop three hypotheses re- 
garding the political determinants of public-sector spending in the Argentine 
provinces. The first two hypotheses are tied to the partisan affiliation of  the 
provincial governor. The third hypothesis is linked to the effect of the presence 
of divided versus unified government on fiscal behavior. 
6.3.1  The Partisan Relationship between the Governor and the President 
Within our common-pool view, the president, who is elected by  a national 
constituency and who is held primarily responsible for macroeconomic out- 
comes, will have better incentives for fiscal conservatism than each provincial 
government. This should be especially the case in a country such as Argentina, 
where the vertical imbalance is severe (Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti, chap. 5 in 
this volume), with the provinces on average receiving nearly four-fifths of their 
revenue from the federal government. 
The Argentine president has many instruments at his or her disposal with 
which to coerce provincial governments into behaving more in line with na- 
tional fiscal objectives. We  posit that, when the provincial governor is from 
the president’s political party, the president has additional coercive resources 
stemming from hisker role as president of  the political party (de jure and/or 
de facto) combined with the relatively high level of party discipline (stemming 
in large part from the high level of partisan control over the nomination pro- 
cess, the use of closed lists to elect legislators, and the high value of the party 
label) in Argentina’s political parties.6 
HYPOTHESIS  1. Provinces where the  governor is from the  same political 
party as the president have lower per capita public-sector spending. 
This hypothesis could also be rationalized on the basis of Aizenman 1998, 
where the fiscal behavior of local authorities is determined as a game that in- 
cludes n local governments, plus the central government. The central govern- 
ment uses some strategic variables in order to induce cooperative play from 
the local governments, as a way to mitigate the common-pool problem. Aizen- 
man’s model assumes that the electoral fortunes of governors are jointly tied to 
aggregate fiscal performance. It would be natural to extend his model to a 
multiparty environment, in which the electoral fortunes of governors from the 
president’s party are more tied to aggregate macroeconomic performance than 
those of the opposition.’ 
6.  For a discussion of the distribution of power within the Argentine political parties see Jones 
7. We thank Osvaldo Schenone for bringing this point to our attention. 
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6.3.2  The Role of Ideology 
Alt and Lowry (1994) demonstrate that in the U.S. states which political 
party controls the state government has an important influence on fiscal out- 
comes. For Alt and Lowry, the driving force behind this salient finding is the 
differential policy preferences of Democrats (high spending, high taxes) and 
Republicans (low spending, low taxes). Within their framework, political con- 
figurations and institutions move the actual outcome closer to one of the pre- 
ferred points. Similar partisan differences in spending patterns among parties 
due to “ideology” have been detected in OECD countries by Kontopoulos and 
Perotti (chap. 4 in this volume). 
In the Argentine context, we hypothesize that partisanship has an important 
influence on fiscal behavior, but that this influence does not stem from partisan 
ideological differences (as is the case in the United States). Instead, partisan- 
ship’s salient effect is the product of the partisan linkage between the presi- 
dent and the provincial governors, combined with the relatively high degree 
of  influence  that  the  Argentine  president  has  over  fellow  party  members 
(e.g., governors). This influence contrasts quite markedly with the very weak 
level of  control exercised by  the U.S. president  over same-party  state gov- 
ernors. 
Between  1983 and  1995 Argentine politics was dominated by  two major 
national political parties: the Partido Justicialista (PJ) (Le., the Peronist Party) 
and the Uni6n Civica Radical (UCR).x  In addition to these two national parties, 
provincial political parties, which effectively compete in only one province, 
have played a significant role in several provinces as either the dominant or 
number two party. 
To our knowledge, we are the first to test for fiscal policy differences be- 
tween Argentina’s two national political parties. Historically, the PJ has been 
classified as a working-class party, while the principal base of  UCR support 
has  been  identified  as  the  middle  class. This characterization,  however, is 
somewhat misleading given the catchall and federal nature of the PJ and UCR, 
combined with the noteworthy policy shift that has taken place since 1989, 
during which time the governing PJ of President Carlos Menem implemented 
a series of far-reaching market-oriented reforms. In any event, it is our intuition 
that the key “political” variable is the one explained in section 6.3.1, and we 
hypothesize that the PJ and UCR will not show different inclinations to tax 
and spend, and thus that the partisan affiliation of  the governor will have no 
significant independent  effect on the level of  provincial  per capita public- 
sector spending. 
8. Over the past decade the UCR has, however, experienced a marked decline in its electoral 
support, leaving the PJ as the only Argentine party with a significant presence in all of the country’s 
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HYPOTHESIS  2. Provinces governed by Peronist and Radical governors do 
not differ in their level of per capita public-sector spending. 
6.3.3  Divided Government 
One of the most prominent political factors hypothesized to influence fiscal 
behavior is the presence or absence of  divided government (Alt and Lowry 
1994; Cox and McCubbins 1997; McCubbins 1991; Poterba 1994). In theory, 
we would expect budget deficits to be larger under divided than under unified 
government, due to the greater difficulties faced by the executive in getting his/ 
her budget through the legislature. Under unified government the governor is 
more likely to be able to rely on a solid partisan contingent in the legislature 
approving hisher budget. This is particularly the case in systems where the 
level of party discipline is relatively high. 
The U.S. and European literature has tended to emphasize the role of  di- 
vided government in preventing fiscal adjustment following adverse shocks 
(e.g., Alt and Lowry 1994; Poterba 1994). The related mechanism, which we 
emphasize in this chapter, is that within each province governors have better 
incentives than the legislature for fiscal prudence, and unified government fa- 
cilitates the governor’s  This follows, at a different level, the same logic 
emphasized in hypothesis 1. 
HYPOTHESIS  3. Provinces where there is divided government have higherper 
capita public-sector spending than provinces where there is uni$ed  gov- 
ernment. 
6.3.4  Other “Domestic” Political Variables 
Other political  variables are also hypothesized  to influence public-sector 
outcomes. Bicameral (as opposed to unicameral) legislatures and larger legis- 
latures (i.e.,  with  more legislators),  for example, are expected to result in 
higher levels of public-sector spending (Gilligan and Matsusaka 1995). Unfor- 
tunately, a bicameralism dummy variable and a variable that measures the size 
of the legislature (ie., the number of legislators) are highly collinear with the 
provincial fixed-effects variables that we employ and are thus not included 
in this analysis. In future work, we will use other procedures  (in particular 
substantively meaningful cross-sectional control variables) that will allow us 
to measure the independent effect of  these and other variables, which at the 
intraprovince level are for the most part invariant across time. 
9. This “level” effect also is emphasized in Alesina et al.  1996, and is the one that derives 
naturally from the work of Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) and Velasco (1998). 142  Mark P.  Jones, Pablo Sanguinetti, and Mariano Tommasi 
6.4  Empirical Analysis 
6.4.1  Data and Variables 
We employ a reduced-form model to analyze the determinants of per capita 
provincial public-sector spending.'O The model is a reduced form of a system 
of equations used in Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 1997b and includes in 
the reduced form all of the independent variables utilized in the original reve- 
nue equation. The reduced form for provincial revenue was also analyzed, but 
as expected, there is no significant impact of the political variables on rev- 
enues. 
We conduct this analysis using a pooled cross-section of the 23 Argentine 
provinces from 1985 to 1995. Out of the potential population of 253 provincial 
years (23 X  1 l), a total of 39 years are excluded, leaving a final analysis popu- 
lation of 214." 
In the analysis our dependent variable is annual per capita public-sector 
spending in the province (excluding interest payments).I2  As is the case with all 
of our monetary variables, the values are expressed in constant 1991 Argentine 
pesos.I3 The range for this variable is 279 to 4,886, while the mean and stan- 
dard deviation are 994 and 696 respectively. 
The basic economic (fiscal) model, subject to Argentine data limitations, em- 
ploys the following control variables: NATIONAL TRANSFERS, ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION,  UNEMPLOYMENT,  LAGGED  PRIMARY  DEFICIT, 
along with variables measuring cross-sectional and temporal effects. 
The variable NATIONAL TRANSFERS measures the amount of transfers 
per capita (in 1991 pesos) received by the province from the national govern- 
10. The purpose of our study is to analyze the effect of political factors on provincial public- 
sector spending. As such, our units of analysis are the provincial years, with all provincial years 
weighted equally. If  our goal were to analyze the determinants of aggregate fiscal outcomes in 
Argentina, then we would give more weight to those provinces where the most spending occurs. 
However, as this is not our goal, we do not include any weighted regression results in our analysis. 
We have run these regressions, which provide results that are relatively similar to those presented 
here, although of course they are in large part reflecting the variables' effects in the province of 
Buenos Aires, which accounts  for 43 percent  and 58 percent  of  the respective combined 23- 
province population and gross industrial production. 
11. Twenty-two provincial years are excluded due to problems surrounding the coding of one of 
our influential variables for the year of  1989 (for more information see note 15). Six provincial 
years are excluded because during those years the province was under federal intervention. Four 
provincial years are excluded due to the lack of unemployment data. Seven years (1985-91)  are 
excluded from the province of Tierra del Fuego, which, as a national territory, was under direct 
federal government control until nearly 1992. Tierra del Fuego achieved provincial status in  1990, 
but did not have a locally elected government until mid-December of 1991. The Federal Capital, 
Argentina's 24th district, was under direct federal government control between 1983 and 1996 and 
is therefore excluded from the analysis. 
12. For more information on the sources of the data used here, see Sanguinetti and Tommasi 
1997. 
13. Following the adoption of the Law of  Convertibility in 1991, the Argentine peso has been 
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ment during the year. As explained in Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 1997b, 
it was included in the structural system alongside the (endogenous) provincial 
own fiscal revenues. The values for this variable range from 99 to 3,738, with 
a mean of 73  1 and a standard deviation of 566. 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION is our proxy for provincial GDP, for which an- 
nual data for the entire population do not exist. The variable is measured as the 
number of  megawatts per capita consumed in the province during the year. 
It ranges from 0.30 to  10.07, with a mean of  1.39 and a standard deviation 
of  1.79. 
UNEMPLOYMENT is the percentage of  the workforce that  was  unem- 
ployed in the province’s capital city during the year.l4 The level of unemploy- 
ment during this period ranged from 1  .OO to 19.35, with a mean level of unem- 
ployment of 7.49 and a standard deviation of 3.47. 
LAGGED PRIMARY DEFICIT is the provincial primary deficit per capita 
(in 1991 pesos), incorporating transfers on the revenue side, in the province 
during the previous year. It ranges from -289  (i.e., a surplus of 289 pesos per 
capita) to 550 (i.e., a deficit of 550 pesos per capita). 
To test our three hypotheses we examine the effect of four political variables 
on the level of per capita provincial public-sector spending. PRESIDENT’S 
PARTY  measures the partisanship of  the governor in relation to that of  the 
president. All years during which the governorship of a province was held by 
a member of the president’s party are coded 1, while all other years are coded 
0. During the period 1985-88 all provinces governed by the UCR are coded 1, 
while all others are coded 0. During the period  1990-95  all of the provinces 
governed by  the PJ are coded 1 while all others are coded 0. In the analysis 
population of  214,  109 of  the provincial years (51 percent) are coded 1. Of 
these  109 years,  86 come from the PJ  administration of  President Carlos 
Menem (1989-95), while the remaining 23 come from the UCR administration 
of President Rad  Alfonsin (1983-89).15 
The second and third variables measure the partisan affiliation of the gover- 
nor. For the variable UCR GOVERNOR, a 1 is assigned if  the province was 
governed by  a member of the UCR during the year being coded. For the vari- 
able PROVINCIAL PARTY GOVERNOR, a 1 is assigned if the province was 
governed by  one of  the country’s center-right provincial parties (i.e., Accih 
Chaquefia in Chaco, the Movimiento Popular Fueguino in Tierra del Fuego, 
the Movimiento Popular Neuquino in NeuquCn, the Pacto Autonomista Liberal 
in Corrientes, the Partido Bloquista in San Juan, and the Partido Renovador de 
14. Two exceptions are the provinces of Buenos Aires and Santa Ft, from which more than one 
city is included. 
15. On July 8, 1989, President Carlos Menem assumed office, five months prior to the date 
(December 10)  on which the official transfer of power from President Ra~l  Alfonsin was constitu- 
tionally scheduled to take place. This early transfer occurred due to the severe economic, political, 
and social crisis facing the country. This year is excluded from the analysis as it is not possible to 
adequately code it for the PRESIDENT’S PARTY variable. 144  Mark P. Jones, Pablo Sanguinetti,  and Mariano Tommasi 
Salta in Salta). Both of these variables are measured as differences from the 
years in provinces that were governed by a PJ governor. Of the 214 provincial 
years included in the analysis, 141 were under a PJ governor, 39 under a UCR 
governor, and 34 under a provincial party governor. 
The fourth variable is DIVIDED GOVERNMENT. Divided government is 
defined here as a situation in which the governor’s party lacks a majority of the 
seats in the single house in unicameral systems and in both houses in bicameral 
systems.’6  We classify as unified government all other cases.” Years in which 
divided government existed are coded 1, while years in which there was unified 
government are coded 0. Of the 214 provincial years, divided government was 
present in 42 (1  8 percent), with unified government in the remaining 172 (82 
percent). 
Finally, included in the analysis are cross-sectional (i.e., provincial; 22 total) 
and temporal (i.e., year; 10 total) fixed-effects variables. For reasons of space 
the estimated coefficients and standard errors for these variables are not in- 
cluded in table 6.2. 
6.4.2  Analysis 
Table 6.2 provides the results of our analysis of the determinants of per cap- 
ita public-sector spending in the Argentine provinces between 1985 and 1995. 
The first equation includes the four control variables along with the cross- 
sectional and temporal fixed-effects variables. The second equation retains the 
variables  in  the  first  equation,  and  adds  the  PRESIDENT’S  PARTY  and 
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT  variables. Finally, the  third equation  adds the 
UCR GOVERNOR and PROVINCIAL PARTY GOVERNOR variables. The 
analysis below concentrates on the unrestricted equation (3). 
The results in  table 6.2 provide strong support for hypothesis  1. PRESI- 
DENT’S PARTY has a prominent inverse effect on the level of per capita pro- 
vincial public-sector spending. The estimated coefficient in equation (3) indi- 
cates that, all other things being equal, a province where the governor is from 
the same party as the president spends 65 pesos per capita less than a province 
where the governor is from an opposition party. 
This finding supports our view, based on the common-pool theory, that gov- 
ernors who are copartisans of the president spend less than other governors. It 
also highlights the value of the common-pool theory, especially when analyz- 
ing units within a context where there is a severe vertical fiscal imbalance. 
Hypothesis 2 is also supported to a considerable extent by the results in table 
6.2. The weak positive result for UCR GOVERNOR indicates that, holding 
16. Like Alt and Lowly (1994), we consider 50 percent a majority. 
17. It would be possible to produce a finer classification. For instance, the case in which the 
governor faces opposition in both chambers may be a stronger form of divided government than 
the case in which he/she has a majority in one of the chambers (“split government” versus “split 
legislature” in the terminology of Alt and Lowly [19941). We, however, have only seven instances 
of a split legislature in our population of 214. Table 6.2  Determinants of Provincial Public-Sector Per Capita Spending 
Equation (1)  Equation (2)  Equation (3) 
Estimated  Standard  Estimated  Standard  Estimated  Standard 
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Adjusted RZ 










(0.051)  0.801** 
(3.190)  -0.349 
(36.995)  30.120 
(0.073)  0.295** 
-39.844* 
-23.550 




(0.051)  0.788** 
(37.665)  47.325 
(3.168)  0.256 
(0.073)  0.224** 
(1 7.758)  -65.41  I** 
(18.201)  -23.374 
18.853 
-  129.840** 













Nore: White-type standard errors are employed. 
*Significant at the .05 level for a two-tailed test. 
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other factors constant, there is no noteworthy difference in per capita spending 
between provinces that were governed by a member of the UCR and provinces 
that were governed by a member of the PJ. 
The only noteworthy difference (which was not included in hypothesis  2) 
that exists is that between provinces that were led by a provincial party gover- 
nor and those that were led by  a PJ governor (or a UCR governor). Holding 
other factors constant, provinces run by a provincial party governor spent sig- 
nificantly less (130 pesos per capita) than provinces run by a PJ governor. This 
is an interesting finding that we plan to explore in future work. 
The results in table 6.2 provide no support whatsoever for hypothesis 3. Not 
only does the presence of divided government fail to lead to a significant in- 
crease in per capita spending, but the negative estimated coefficient indicates 
that the presence of divided government actually reduces spending, albeit not 
at a significant level. 
A possible explanation for the weak effect of the presence  or absence of 
divided government on spending could be that whereas previous studies of this 
effect have analyzed governments with relatively closed fiscal environments 
(e.g., countries or the U.S. states), the Argentine provinces exist within an envi- 
ronment where there is a severe fiscal imbalance between  the national and 
provincial governments. This fiscal imbalance in turn shifts the key determi- 
nant of provincial spending from intraprovincial factors to interprovincial fac- 
tors, since the lion’s share of potential revenues is located at the national level. 
Within this environment intraprovincial politics (e.g., divided government) is 
much less relevant for provincial  fiscal behavior  than  is the interprovincial 
game between the provinces (as unitary actors) and the federal government.’* 
6.5  Fiscal Institutions and Provincial Public-Sector Spending 
Alesina et al. (1996), Hallerberg  and von Hagen (chap. 9 in this volume), 
von Hagen  (1992), and von Hagen and Harden (1994) have emphasized  the 
prominent effect that budgetary institutions have on fiscal behavior. Unfortu- 
nately, in Argentina there was little intraprovince budgetary institutions vari- 
ance between  1985 and 1995. It was therefore not possible to include in our 
previous models a variable measuring the provinces’ fiscal institutions. 
However, given the potential relevance of budgetary institutions to provin- 
cial public-sector spending, as well as this volume’s concern with budgetary 
institutions,  we briefly  analyze the link between  budgetary  institutions  and 
spending in this section. Following a procedure similar to von Hagen (1992) 
18. Future studies should explore the prediction that divided government at the subnational level 
would be a significant determinant of  fiscal behavior only when vertical fiscal imbalances are 
small. See Stein, Talvi, and  Grisanti, chap. 5  in this volume; and von  Hagen and Eichengreen 
1996 for further speculation on the interaction of  vertical fiscal imbalances with fiscal politics 
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Table 6.3  Provincial Fiscal Institutionalization  and Provincial Fiscal Behavior 
Variables  Estimated Coefficient 
Bivariate Regression (1). Fiscal Institutionalization Index and 
provincial fixed-effects coefficients (from equation [3]) 
Bivariate regression (2). Fiscal Institutionalization Index and 
average per capita provincial public-sector expenditures 
(for 1985-95) 
Bivariate regression (3). Fiscal Institutionalization Index and 







Noret N = 23. In each bivariate regression the Fiscal Institutionalization Index is the independent 
variable. The standard errors are reported under the estimated coefficients in parentheses. 
for Western European countries and Alesina et al. (1996) for Latin American 
countries, we utilized the provincial constitutions to construct an index of the 
level of fiscal institutionalization for the 23 Argentine  province^.'^ Using a 10- 
point scale (with 10 being the most fiscally institutionalized, and 0 the least) 
we  coded provinces on the basis of  the following six factors: (1) executive 
strength vis-i-vis the legislature in the elaboration of the budget, (2) the extent 
of limitations on provincial indebtedness, (3) the ability of the municipalities 
within the province to borrow money, (4) the autonomy/strength of provincial 
auditory agencies, (5) the  incentives for fiscal prudence in  the provincial- 
municipal tax-sharing agreement, and (6) the presence of promotional subsi- 
dies in the constitution. These six indicators were summed to create an index of 
fiscal institutionalization.  This index has a potential range from 0 (least fiscally 
disciplined) to 60 (most fiscally disciplined). Its actual range is from 13 (Salta) 
to 45 (Mendoza). 
Regression (1) in table 6.3 displays the results of  the bivariate regression 
of  the Fiscal Institutionalization Index on the estimated coefficients for the 
provincial (cross-sectional) fixed-effects variables from equation (3) in table 
6.2. The Fiscal Institutionalization Index has a very weak effect on the provin- 
cial fixed-effects coefficients. This suggests that the lack of a fiscal institutions 
variable in our models of per capita provincial public-sector spending has no 
salient impact on the results that are shown in table 6.2. This premise is bol- 
stered by the finding in regression (2) of table 6.3, where the estimated coeffi- 
cient indicates that a province’s budgetary institutions (i.e., the Fiscal Institu- 
tionalization Index) have a very weak effect on its level of per capita provincial 
public-sector spending during the 1985-95 period. 
Finally, while this study does not analyze deficits, due to their importance 
in this literature we include in table 6.3 the result (see regression [3]) of  the 
19. Unlike this previous work, our index is based on a coding of written documents, not on 
reported procedures. For a detailed discussion of  the methodology employed to create this index 
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regression  of  the Fiscal Institutionalization  Index on the average per capita 
primary deficit in the provinces. The strong and significant estimated coeffi- 
cient indicates a powerful inverse bivariate relationship between the fiscal in- 
stitutions employed by the 23 provinces and the size of their per capita deficits, 
with greater levels of fiscal institutionalization leading to smaller deficits. This 
result corresponds with our previous work, which found the level of provincial 
fiscal institutionalization to have a potent effect on provincial fiscal behavior 
(Jones, Sanguinetti, and Tommasi 1997a). It is also consistent with many previ- 
ous studies by von Hagen and others that have found budget institutionalization 
variables to have salient explanatory power for deficits, but not for spending. 
6.6  Conclusion 
This chapter applies the “political economy” approach to the study of fiscal 
performance in the Argentine provinces. Using a panel of the 23 provinces for 
the  1985-95  period,  we find support for the common-property approach to 
fiscal policy. Given a high degree of vertical imbalance (i.e., a lack of corre- 
spondence between spending and taxing decisions at the local level), provin- 
cial governments tend to overexploit the common resource of national taxation. 
In this game, the federal government elected by a nationwide constituency has 
better  incentives toward  fiscal restraint.  Given a relatively  institutionalized 
party system and high degree of party discipline, presidents are able to “in- 
duce” lower spending by  governors from their political party (thereby inter- 
nalizing part of the fiscal externality). 
The Argentine provinces provide a fertile and relatively unexplored ground 
for the study of the effects of institutions and politics on economic outcomes. 
In future work we will pursue three tasks. First, via the use of alternative quan- 
titative methods we will include additional variables that were excluded in this 
analysis due to collinearity problems. Second, we will explore the fiscal impact 
of budget procedures in more detail. Third, we will engage in a more refined 
analysis of the link between institutions and expenditures by disaggregating 
expenditures in such a way that we will be able to distinguish public goods 
expenditures from particularistic expenditures. 
The goal of this current and future research is to contribute to the improve- 
ment of general scholarly knowledge on the effect of political and institutional 
factors on fiscal behavior as well as to provide a better understanding of  the 
determinants of fiscal outcomes in Argentina. In particular, we hope that this 
work will be of assistance to those currently engaged in the reform of Argenti- 
na’s political and economic institutions at the national and provincial levels. 149  Politics, Institutions, and Public-Sector Spending 
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